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WHEN ACTUALLY READING THE LETTER OF THE LAW DOES 
MORE HARM THAN GOOD: U.S. v. ALEYNIKOV, TRADING 
ALGORITHMS, AND STATUTORY GAPS 
Patrick Holland∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION—FRAMING THE ISSUES 
In United States v. Aleynikov the Second Circuit first held that 
Goldman Sachs’ computer source code used in high frequency trading 
(HFT) models did not fall under the statutory definition of a stolen “good,” 
“ware,” or “merchandise” under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).1 
Therefore the defendant’s theft of the code did not violate the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA).2 Source code begins simply as human language.3 It 
is composed of readable instructions physically typed in by a computer 
programmer, which are then translated into functioning code through a 
process called assembly.4 Aleynikov’s holding sets the precarious precedent 
of acknowledging the tangible value of an intangible good, while 
simultaneously refusing to extend protection to that very good.5 This 
contradiction highlights the inherent definitional flaws embedded within 
both the NSPA and the EEA. Both statutes possess an inability to serve as 
viable options for the curtailment of information technology theft. Author 
Matthew Allen posits that in an information technology driven marketplace 
non-tangible innovations are not only a sign of power, but are often the 
most valuable asset a company possesses.6 Aleynikov illustrates the 
                                                                                                                           
 
∗ J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2013. 
1 United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82. 
3 Deborah F. Buckman, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 180 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2002). 
4 Id. 
5 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82. 
6 Matthew P. Allen, High Stakes Sleuthing: Handling Corporate and IP Espionage Matters in the 
Information Age, 2012 WL 1670120 at 20 (2012). 
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disconnect between the NSPA and the EEA regarding the protection 
afforded to intangible goods. 
Part II of this note will give a general overview and evaluation of the 
Second Circuit’s ruling in Aleynikov. This will give us our baseline rules 
that will drive forward our overall analysis. Part III will take on a historical 
perspective. It will track the evolution of different methods of intellectual 
property protection that have been applied to source code in the past. Part 
IV and V will dive into a substantive analysis of both the National Stolen 
Property Act and the Economic Espionage Act. An understanding of how 
these two statutes function, and have been interpreted by courts, will arm us 
with a better sense of how they can be improved to better protect source 
code. Finally in Part VI, this note will reach into the past to explain the 
importance of equitable judicial interpretation. Most importantly, this note 
will suggest the application of an enduring judicial maxim that could have 
counteracted the flaws in Second Circuit’s decision. 
A proper definition for the misappropriated source code in Aleynikov is 
especially important given the rise of high frequency trading systems on 
Wall Street.7 Specially designed financial trading algorithms are comprised 
of source code that allows the system to decide aspects of trading order, 
timing, price, and the quantity to buy or sell, all without the need for human 
intervention.8 The codes animating these trading algorithms are some of the 
most valuable pieces of property that a financial institution can own.9 The 
lack of understanding that these codes are indeed protectable “goods” is 
worrisome in an industry that is so dependent on the use of cutting edge 
technology.10 
In an attempt to remedy this issue, both the NSPA and the EEA need 
to be updated to reflect intangible source code as a protectable good. 
Different modes of intellectual property allow for source code’s protection, 
so why should there be a statutory variation to muddy the already complex 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 See HFT Review, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING & ALGORITHMIC TRADING, available at 
http://www.hftreview.com/pg/blog/mike/read/5307/high-frequency-trading-algorithmic-trading/ 
(accessed Feb. 15, 2010) [hereinafter HFT Review]. 
8 Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the Lack of 
Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209 (2011). 
9 See Allen, supra note 6, at 20. 
10 See HFT Review, supra note 7, available at http://www.hftreview.com/pg/blog/mike/read/ 
5307/high-frequency-trading-algorithmic-trading/ (accessed Feb. 15, 2010). 
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waters? Under current judicial holdings, the NSPA, and by extension the 
EEA, have been precluded “from becoming a potential recourse against 
source code theft.”11 The overly narrow definition of a “good” contained in 
the NSPA and the EEA, as highlighted by Aleynikov, calls for a legislative 
makeover tailored to expand the definition of a “good” to encompass source 
code. 
II. UNITED STATES V. ALEYNIKOV—OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
Sergey Aleynikov was a Goldman Sachs employee tasked with 
developing computer source code that could be used in their high frequency 
trading (HFT) system.12 Specifically, Aleynikov’s code would support 
infrastructure programs that used algorithms to determine which trades to 
make and when to do so.13 A HFT system is capable of making large 
amounts of trades in fractions of a second, on the basis of market 
information provided to it by an algorithm that recognizes key market 
shifts.14 Goldman so valued this information that it required employees to 
sign confidentiality agreements and refused any licensing overtures.15 
In 2009, Aleynikov accepted a position with a Chicago-based start-up 
(Teza Technologies) that was interested in developing its own HFT 
system.16 Teza gave Aleynikov six months to develop a HFT trading 
system, which usually take years for a team of programmers to construct.17 
On his last day at Goldman, Aleynikov encrypted and uploaded to a third 
party server 500,000 lines of source code that were used in Goldman’s HFT 
system.18 Specifically, the uploaded code contained key pieces that were 
used in Goldman’s trading algorithms and market data connectivity 
evaluations.19 After transferring the code from the third-party server to his 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 Tamara J. Wayland, Computer Technology—The National Stolen Property Act and Its 
Applicability to Property Rights in Computer Source Code—Do Rights Exist?—United States v. Brown, 
925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991), 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 155, 169 (1992). 
12 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 73. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 74. 
17 Id. 
18 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74. 
19 Id. 
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personal flash drive, Aleynikov traveled to Chicago claiming to have the 
needed tools to begin HFT construction.20 Upon returning home the 
following day, Aleynikov was arrested for violating the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA) by illegally converting a trade secret, with the intent 
to economically benefit another party.21 He was subsequently charged with 
also violating the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), which makes it a 
crime to “transport, transmit, or transfer in interstate or foreign commerce 
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 
or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by 
fraud.”22 
A. The Second Circuit’s Ruling—The NSPA Argument 
In regards to the NSPA-based claim, the court questioned whether “the 
source code that Aleynikov uploaded to a server in Germany, then 
downloaded to his computer devices in New Jersey, and later transferred to 
Illinois, constituted stolen ‘goods’. . . .”23 The Second Circuit reasoned that 
in order to constitute a violation under the NSAP a good must be stolen, 
and that good must be tangible property taken from its rightful owner.24 The 
Second Circuit adopted a precedent articulated by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) that concluded that 
a “computer program itself is intangible intellectual property . . . it alone 
cannot constitute goods, wares, merchandise, securities or moneys which 
have been stolen . . . for purposes of the NSPA.”25 Therefore, since the 
source code stolen by Aleynikov from Goldman Sachs was not tangible in 
nature, he could not be held liable for the theft of a “good” under the 
NSAP. 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 Id. 
21 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74; Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012). 
22 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74; National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2013). 
23 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 75. 
24 Id. at 76–77. 
25 Id. at 77; see also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 
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B. The Second Circuit’s Ruling—The EEA Argument 
Aleynikov was charged with violating the second substantive 
provision contained in the EEA. This requires that the stolen product be 
“produced for” or “placed in” interstate or foreign commerce.26 The Second 
Circuit ruled that Goldman’s source code was neither “produced for” nor 
“placed in” interstate or foreign commerce, despite moving from New 
York, to New Jersey, and then to Chicago.27 The court focused on the code 
itself rather than Aleynikov’s actions with it. Since the code was highly 
secretive and only available to Goldman, the court concluded that it was 
never meant to enter or pass through commerce.28 The HFT system at its 
inception was designed to solely benefit Goldman. Therefore, Aleynikov’s 
source code theft, which was used for the system’s function, was not a 
violation of the EEA’s requirement that the HFT system be “produced for” 
or “placed in” interstate or foreign commerce.29 
C. Judge Calabresi’s Concurrence: Illustrating the Problems Ahead 
While not outwardly dissenting with the Second Circuit’s strict textual 
rulings, Judge Calabresi’s separate opinion highlights the possible 
difficulties that a decision of this nature can create. He stressed the 
importance of reading the law within the context of its purported goal.30 
The EEA was a legislative response to rulings handed down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. Judge Calabresi notes that, ‘[w]hile 
the legislative history can be read to create some ambiguity as to how broad 
a reach the EEA was designed to have, it is hard for me to conclude that 
Congress, in this law, actually meant to exempt the kind of behavior in 
which Aleynikov engaged.”31 Aleynikov may technically be correct in its 
reading of the law, but this overly strict ruling is presented in a vacuum, 
devoid of any context. Judge Calabresi thought this matter to be so 
important that he urged Congress to return to the issue of the NSPA, in an 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
27 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 82 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
31 Id. at 83; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 6 (1996). 
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effort to state unequivocally what he believed they meant to make criminal 
under the EEA.32 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND 
SOURCE CODE 
In his treatise detailing the interplay between the ever-changing fields 
of technology and the law, Raymond Nimmer notes the inherit difficulty in 
treating software as a good when its subject matter and relevance are often 
intangible.33 Source code’s intangible nature may prohibit its inclusion 
under certain statutory definitions of a “good,” but certain forms of 
intellectual property protection are available to give owners the protection 
their desire. It is important to understand the evolution of intangible 
intellectual property, and how our technology-based marketplace is forcing 
both the legislature and judiciary to reconsider the attributes of a “good.” 
A. Source Code as a Protectable Trade Secret 
The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) is the current legal framework 
that 46 states have adopted to harmonize standards and remedies regarding 
misappropriation of a business’ trade secret.34 It codifies trade secret 
definitions and remedies that have evolved through the common law. § 1.4 
of the UTSA defines “trade secret” as: 
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.35 
This conjunctive metric can be boiled down to whether the nature of the 
economically valuable information is confidential, and if so, what were the 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 Id. at 83. 
33 Raymond T. Nimmer, What law governs (goods, services, intangibles)—Goods or intangibles, 
LAW COMPUTER TECH. (2012). 
34 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, available at http:// 
uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act. 
35 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1.4, Trade Secret (1985). 
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precautions taken by the owner of said information to maintain its 
confidentiality? When faced with a trade secret misappropriation claim 
these two questions are fact intensive inquiries.36 
For example, Goldman could first assert that the monetary windfall 
derived from its source code when applied to its trading algorithm was so 
valuable in the marketplace because it was unknown and coveted by other 
financial firms. To articulate this, they would present fact-specific 
information detailing their efforts to maintain the code’s secrecy, like the 
confidentiality agreements signed by their employees. A well plead premise 
of this nature would possibly allow Goldman to use trade secret law to 
protect its valuable, but intangible property.37 On a macro-level, trade secret 
law is “left to create a balance of interests, which allows the trade secret 
holder to share information with his employees or others while still 
maintaining the ownership and competitive advantage of that information in 
an increasingly information-based economy.”38 
B. Confidentiality Agreements and Restrictive Employment Covenants 
Possibly the most used form of source code protection is the 
deployment of confidentiality clauses in employment contracts that restrict 
what a current or former employee can disclose to the public or future 
employers.39 When the employer has taken the appropriate steps to protect 
its software or source code through a defined avenue of intellectual 
property, separate contractual agreements bind the employee into secrecy. 
The threat of litigation looms for an employee who breaches these 
contractual provisions. These agreements can be broad or extremely 
specific in construction.40 
                                                                                                                           
 
36 Agency Solutions.Com, LLC v. TriZetto Group, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1021 (E.D. Cal. 
2011). 
37 See Alan J. Tracey, The Contract In The Trade Secret Ballroom—A Forgotten Dance Partner?, 
16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 48 (2007). 
38 Id. 
39 Jere M. Webb, Advantages of Using Confidentiality Agreements, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.stoel.com/Files/ConfidentialityAgreement 
Guide.pdf. 
40 See generally Tracey, supra note 37. 
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For example, a former employee could take confidential information 
about the software to his new employer, not the software itself. A broadly 
stated confidentiality agreement could foreclose disclosure of the source 
itself and also the information that went into building it. The goal of these 
restrictive agreements is to protect the parent company from the 
unauthorized use or disclosure by current or former employees (i.e. those 
who stand in a “confidential relationship” with the true owner of the 
information).41 Author Daniel Friesen highlights nine claims that employers 
have successfully asserted when their confidential source code has been 
improperly disclosed in violation of a restrictive covenant: a copyright 
violation, trade secret theft, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty in 
violation of the ongoing duty of loyalty, tortuous interference of a 
prospective business advantage, civil conspiracy to injury one’s business, 
fraud, unjust enrichment, and finally common law theft or conversion.42 
C. Source Code as a Protectable Copyright 
The 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976, specifically 
includes as protectable subject matter, “computer programs . . . only to the 
extent that they incorporate authorship in a programmer’s original 
expression of ideas, as distinguished from ideas themselves.”43 The court in 
Control Data Systems, Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 
1995) succinctly illustrates the application of this principal. In Control 
Data, the court held that the copying of 2,000 lines of operating system 
source code was sufficient to warrant injunctive protection.44 This stemmed 
from the defendant building a duplicate computer that allowed customers to 
use application programs designed specifically to be used on the plaintiff’s 
network.45 
Copyrightable source code can come into being when a programmer 
writes a single original line of code; therefore complex code instructions 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Webb, supra note 39. 
42 Daniel Friesen, Enjoining Former Employees from Taking Software, 24 COLO. LAW. 1771, 
1772 (1995). 
43 Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980); see also Deborah F. Buckman, 
Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 180 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2002). 
44 Control Data Systems, Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1995). 
45 Control Data Systems, Inc., 903 F. Supp. at 1325. 
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can be covered by multiple copyrights given the individual values of each 
single line.46 Generally, copyright is a preferred method of protection for 
the object code that goes into a program (i.e. the actual instructions that 
control what the computer will do).47 The source code used to build the 
object code is usually assigned trade secret distinction.48 It is important to 
understand that copyright, as a mode of protection is not foreclosed upon 
when applied to source code. The Copyright Office regards source code and 
object code as equivalent for purposes of registration.49 An important 
limitation to copyright protection that one must be cognizant of is fair use. 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act codifies this limitation allowing certain 
copying of copyrighted material when it is necessary for uncovering basic 
ideas.50 
IV. THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT—A FAILURE TO PROTECT 
SOURCE CODE 
The NSPA is the federal codification of statutes that protect personal 
property in the U.S. Over the years, courts have been unsure how far of a 
reach this piece of legislation should have, refusing to extend protection to 
owners of copyrightable computer programs.51 The NSPA’s scope has been 
expanded to include less tangible items like geophysical maps and chemical 
formulas.52 The question remains why the legislative gap in terms of 
protection for source code? Overly strict textual interpretation has 
highlighted an inherent flaw in the legislation that demands immediate 
attention. Aleynikov’s improper copying, and subsequent theft of 
Goldman’s source code, for the benefit of a competitor clearly rings of bad 
faith on multiple levels. He survived criminal sanctions through the shrewd 
application of judicial precedents that have read the NSAP in an extremely 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 Lee A. Hollaar, Source Code and Object Code, COPYRIGHT OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS, 
available at http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise26.html. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See United States Copyright Office, Circular 61, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER 
PROGRAMS, available at http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise26.html. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
51 See generally Wayland, supra note 11. 
52 See United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Greenwald, 479 
F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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static fashion. The source of this problem can be traced back to the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Brown.53 Brown and its progeny’s 
overly strict reading of the NSPA deny the marketability and value of 
intangible goods, like computer source code, leaving copyright as the 
predominant method of remedy. This failure ignores the distinction that 
exists between criminal theft and the infringement upon one’s legally 
protected copyright.54 
A. United States v. Brown—The Origin of the Problem 
Defendant Brown, while employed at The Software Link (TSL), was 
allowed access to a computer program (PC-MOS/386) that permitted 
advanced microcomputer functions.55 Brown soon left TSL and became 
embroiled in an FBI investigation regarding the theft of the PC-MOS/386 
source code.56 After investigation, authorities found hard evidence that 
Brown had copied and transferred the source code to another person in New 
Mexico.57 The U.S. charged Brown with violating 18 U.S.C §§ 2314, 2515 
of the NSPA.58 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in 
applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dowling dismissed Brown’s 
charges because they held “that crimes involving mere copyright 
infringements do not fall under the ambit of ‘physical goods, wares, [or] 
merchandise’ required by section 2314.”59 The issuing facing the Tenth 
Circuit was whether stolen computer source code could satisfy the 
“physical” requirement of § 2314, as articulated by Dowling. 
The government argued that when Brown scrawled pieces of the code 
onto notebook paper and copied pieces onto a disk that he had satisfied the 
tangibility requirement in Dowling.60 Moreover, they asserted that Brown 
knew the secretive nature of the source code by pointing to the fact that 
employees were not permitted to ever remove it from TSL, and no one 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991). 
54 See Wayland, supra note 11, at 165–69. 
55 Brown, 925 F.2d at 1302. 
56 Id. at 1303. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Wayland, supra note 11, at 156. 
60 Brown, 925 F.2d at 1305–07. 
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outside of TSL even knew of the code’s existence.61 This created a 
distinction from Dowling, which dealt with the reproduction of items that 
were easily accessible to the public.62 They reasoned that the secretive 
nature of the code necessitated a special type of protection under the NSPA. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected all of these arguments, deciding rather to honor 
the Dowling precedent. They ruled that § 2314 of the NSPA applied only to 
physical goods, wares, or merchandise; purely intellectual property falls 
outside of the Act’s purview.63 Brown escaped conviction because the court 
focused on the source code’s inherently intangible nature as a way to 
disqualify it from NSPA protection. It is this overly narrow reading of the 
law that has allowed other individuals, like Aleynikov, to escape 
punishment for their criminal actions. 
B. The NSPA—Interpretation and  Legislative Intent 
The ever-increasing value of source code as a commodity requires that 
the legislative gaps contained in the NSPA be updated to reflect a more 
modern interpretation of what constitutes a good or wear. Brown and 
Aleynikov rule that because computer source code is intangible, and only 
becomes tangible when copied onto a hard drive or disk, the code itself is 
not a good under the NSPA. This formulation is an outmoded 
differentiation of what a good is in 2013. Some academics have defended 
the conservative judicial reading of the NSPA claiming that “in the context 
of computer code, the copyright laws do much to protect the owner where 
the Act lulls.”64 To counter this, others point to dicta in United States v. 
Wright, 791 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1986) that stated the “NSPA has a broad 
purpose. Congress intended the Act [to] be a deterrent to the commission of 
interstate crime, and it should be interpreted in light of that intent.”65 It is in 
this vein that the NSPA should be understood, and therefore expanded to 
cover the types of illegal activity committed by Aleynikov. 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 Id. at 1306. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1307–09. 
64 Chad A. McGowan, Stolen Software, Data Files and the National Stolen Property Act, 8 AUG. 
S.C. LAW. 38 (1996). 
65 United States v. Wright, 791 F.2d 133, 137 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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One could argue that an expansion of the NSPA’s definition of a 
“good” to include goods that are non-physically rendered or intangible is a 
moot argument when copyright protection for source code is available. This 
argument does have merit, but its logic is somewhat negated by the 
increasing dependence on information technology and computer coding. In 
United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1990) the court held that 
the electronic interstate transfer of misappropriated propriety information 
from 911 text files fell within the scope of the NSPA.66 The Riggs court 
cautioned “reading a tangibility requirement into the definition of goods, 
wares, or merchandise might unduly restrict the scope of § 2314, especially 
in this modern technological age.”67 
The importance of strict judicial readings of the law cannot be 
understated, but that very legislation itself must be a reflection of changing 
economic and technological times. While the judiciary has properly applied 
the tangibility requirements for the NSPA’s application in the past, these 
requirements need to be modified so the NSPA can be used in conjunction 
with copyright protection as applied to source code. Overly strict judicial 
readings can be counteracted if Congress enacts “specialized legislation to 
combat the theft of source code and computer programs rather than modify 
current copyright law.”68 Adding this arrow to a property owner’s quiver 
will strengthen an owner’s ability to protect their valuable computer source 
code from theft or other criminal activity. 
C. Prosecutorial Failure to Charge Aleynikov Under the NSPA? 
Perhaps the true burden of responsibility for opening this legislative 
can of worms can be laid at the feet of the U.S. attorneys that charged 
Aleynikov under the NSPA. The Act itself clearly states in § 2314 that it 
will only apply to physical goods, and makes no mention of intangible 
goods.69 One possible explanation for the government’s actions is 
overconfidence in the case they were presenting. Aleynikov clearly had 
stolen highly secretive source code from Goldman and smuggled it to a new 
                                                                                                                           
 
66 United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 424 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
67 Riggs, 739 F. Supp. at 421. 
68 See Wayland, supra note 11, at 169. 
69 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 
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employer in Illinois. Prosecutors may have viewed this as an opportunity to 
present a case that would force the Second Circuit to enlarge the acceptable 
definition of a “good” under the NSPA. Gambling for a looser definition 
may have allowed Aleynikov to escape conviction. Since source code did 
not come under the legislative definition articulated by the NSPA, the EEA 
was not violated since the good was not “produced for” or “placed in” 
interstate or foreign commerce.70 The U.S. attorneys must have been trying 
for a game changing decision from the Second Circuit that would judicially 
solidify source code as protectable under the NSPA. There seems to be no 
other way to color their choice to employ such a risky strategy. 
V. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT—OVERLY NARROW READING OF A 
GENERAL PROHIBITION? 
To add further insult to injury, the U.S. government’s EEA claim 
against Aleynikov was also summarily dismissed. The indictment charged 
him with violating § 1832(a) of the EEA for the unauthorized taking, 
copying, or receiving of trade secrets in the domestic context.71 The EEA’s 
main concern is to combat interstate and foreign economic espionage 
primarily through the theft of valuable corporate trade secrets.72 The Act 
serves to protect trade secrets that are of value to U.S. businesses against 
the type of actions that Aleynikov and others like him perpetrated. The 
increased understanding of source code, and how it fits into the greater 
scheme of a business’s infrastructure, has made it easier than ever to steal 
confidential material.73 The EEA functions as a safeguard for this type of 
valuable information. 
A. EEA § 1832(a)—A Losing Battle for the Government 
The general domestic prohibition in the EEA imposes fines or jail time 
on anyone who knowingly converts or conspires to convert: 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 78. 
71 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
72 See Tracey, supra note 37, at 47–48; 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
73 Id. 
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[A] trade secret, that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or 
placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone 
other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, 
injure any owner of that trade secret . . . .74 
On December 28, 2012, Congress altered the language of § 1832(a) 
somewhat by inserting “a product or service used in or intended for use in” 
to replace “or included in a product that is produced for or placed in.”75 The 
EEA had less established case law than that of the NSPA, so even more 
emphasis is placed upon a careful reading of the statute and how it is 
construed. The Second Circuit’s reasoning hinges upon it’s reading of the 
two separate, but related, categories contained in § 1832(a): “produced for 
commerce” and “placed in commerce.”76 It seems counter intuitive that the 
EEA’s main purpose is to protect American businesses from theft of their 
trade secrets by foreign or domestic entities; when the Second Circuit’s 
reading of the law allows Aleynikov to escape responsibility for the very 
actions the Act was meant to protect against.77 It remains to be seen if the 
legislative modification on December 28, 2012 is sufficient to remedy this 
issue. 
The Second Circuit read a limitation in § 1832(a)’s language that 
becomes key in the court’s reasoning. The limitation is that the 
misappropriated product must be either “produced for” or “placed in” 
interstate of foreign commerce.78 The court notes that this particular 
language is absent from § 1831’s broader foreign-entity prohibition.79 It is 
this limitation that the court uses to subvert the true intention of the Act for 
the sake of a strict textual interpretation. The court explains that products 
“placed in” commerce have already been introduced into the stream of 
commerce and have reached the marketplace.80 Conversely, products that 
are “produced for” commerce are still being developed prepared fully for 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
75 P.L. 112-236, Dec. 28, 2012. 
76 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
77 See generally Allyson A. McKenzie, United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu: An Examination of the 
Confidentiality Provision in the Economic Espionage Act: Is it Suitable to Maintain the Use and 
Effectiveness of the EEA?, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 309 (2000). 
78 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 80. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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consumer consumption.81 Since Goldman’s system was not “produced for” 
or “placed in” any commerce stream, it fell outside of the EEA’s scope. To 
support this conclusion, the Second Circuit mentions that Goldman had no 
intentions of ever disclosing this source code to anyone.82 The secrecy 
surrounding the code barred it from ever truly entering or passing in 
commerce to the consumer. Therefore, since Aleynikov’s actions revolved 
around a theft of code that was not “produced for” or “placed in” interstate 
or foreign commerce, the EEA was inapplicable.83 
B. Defending the District Court’s Interpretation of § 1832(a) of the EEA 
Aleynikov’s premise for his defense was that Goldman’s source code 
used in their HFT algorithm does not constitute a product produced for or 
placed in interstate or foreign commerce. This stemmed from the secrecy 
surrounding the code, which was to be used solely for Goldman’s internal 
benefit.84 By applying a plain meaning to “produced for” interstate or 
foreign commerce, the District Court ruled that Goldman’s source code was 
the exact type of product that the EEA was supposed to protect.85 The court 
illustrates the interstate nature of the code by pointing out that Goldman 
would use their trading algorithm to execute high volumes of financial 
trades in numerous markets around the world.86 They dismissed 
Aleynikov’s plea to narrowly construe § 1832(a) to cover only tangible 
consumer products sold in commerce. The District Court avoids the 
problem warned of in Judge Calabresi’s concurrence of reading the EEA in 
a legislative vacuum. The District Court acknowledged the growing 
importance of computer source code in financial marketplaces. Pulling from 
the legislative history surrounding the Act, its becomes clear that Congress 
intended for the EEA to comprehensively protect trade secrets belonging to 
U.S. companies, not just the manufacture of tangible consumer products.87 
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84 United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 177 (S.D. N.Y. 2010). 
85 Id. at 177. 
86 Id. 
87 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–7 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 6–11 (1996). 
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One could argue that the District Court’s analysis of § 1832 is broader 
than what the statute intended. This argument may have merit, but it fails to 
take into account the political, economic, and pragmatic factors that go into 
an evaluation of the law. These factors cannot be ignored when a judicial 
opinion is handed down. Changing societal norms and business practices 
drive both the legislature and the judiciary to protect interests that the 
populous currently view as important. The issue surrounding Aleynikov, 
and the EEA’s application to his case, may have more to do with the 
recalibration of legislation, as opposed to flawed judicial reasoning. Bad 
law will only produce bad results when that law is tested by hard cases like 
this one. The District Court seemed to be aware of this fact, and changing 
business norms, when they held that Aleynikov violated § 1832(a). The 
court recalls a principal espoused by the Supreme Court in Salinas v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1997) that notes, “[n]o rule of construction 
. . . requires that a penal statute be strained and distorted in order to exclude 
conduct clearly intended to be within its scope.”88 The Second Circuit’s 
overly technical reading of § 1832(a) of the EEA does just that; denying 
Goldman’s trade secret the protection that the EEA was supposed to 
provide. 
C. The Need for Modifications to Strengthen the EEA 
The change to a more global economy, based upon massive amounts 
of information being transferred at high speeds, necessitates legislation to 
reflect such a shift. Technological information functions “as currency of the 
new millennium” and its protection has been equated with our country’s 
national security.89 The current rule that a business’s intangible 
misappropriated trade secret that is not “placed in” or “produced for” 
interstate or foreign commerce falls outside the EEA’s protection is an 
untenable position. For example, corporations like Google have been built 
primarily on intellectual property that is secret to the Google brand. The 
Second Circuit’s ruling in Aleynikov pertaining to the EEA is so strictly 
construed that it disables the Act from being able to satisfy its original 
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89 See Allen, supra note 6, at 20. 
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legislative intent.90 The proper application of legislation requires that its 
intent be satisfied, while also acknowledging the shifts in a particular field 
that the legislation was meant to protect. 
Circling back to Judge Calabresi’s concurrence for the Second Circuit 
can be especially instructive in our evaluation. While agreeing with the 
majority “that the text of the EEA is such that it would require stretching to 
cover Aleynikov’s acts,” he stresses that law must be read in context to 
include the entirety of the statute and the “mischief” those statues were 
enacted to combat.91 He reasons that the EEA was a legislative retort to the 
Supreme Court in Dowling that held the NSPA did not cover intellectual 
property.92 The EEA was meant to function as a shield to protect 
corporations and a legislative gap filler to cover intellectual property. The 
utility of the EEA is handicapped by the decision in Aleynikov. When 
speaking about the EEA, Judge Calabresi concludes, “it is hard for me to 
conclude that Congress, in this law, actually meant to exempt the kind of 
behavior in which Aleynikov engaged.”93 The newly enacted language 
modification in late 2012 may have achieved this. But until this new 
language is judicially interpreted, Aleyinkov’s shadow looms large. 
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO READING AND APPLYING THE LAW—
HEYDON’S CASE 
The problem created by the Aleynikov decision could be remedied if an 
alternative form of judicial interpretation was applied. Instead of plain 
meaning, or the “Golden Rule,” which allows judges to depart from the 
strict wording of the law to avoid an “absurd result,” guidance could be 
gleaned from Heydon’s Case.94 This old English rule of legislative 
interpretation created in 1584 requires judges to look over “four tasks” to 
ensure that the gaps within the law are covered.95 Justice Coke described 
the four tasks as four specific questions a judge needs to consider in the 
process of legislative interpretation: 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–7 (1996). 
91 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ct. Exchequer 1584). 
95 Id. 
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What was the common law before the making of the Act? What was the 
mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? What remedy 
the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the 
commonwealth? And the true reason of the remedy . . . . 96 
The primary goal of the rule is to eliminate the potential “mischief” that a 
statute was originally aimed to remedy.97 This gives judges the needed 
latitude to “consider [the] four contextual aspects of a statute when deciding 
how to interpret that statute.”98 Despite its age, the Supreme Court has 
endorsed this view and applied it in numerous decisions.99 
The mischief that the NSPA and the EEA were enacted to combat was 
the theft a business’s valuable trade secrets. Simply allowing Aleynikov to 
walk away from his blatant theft and attempted interstate transaction 
because of a legislative technicality cannot be allowed. Application of the 
Heydon principal demonstrates that the Second Circuit’s decision has not 
fulfilled all four tasks. Their decision is devoid of context in favor of an 
overly restrictive reading. If anything, their decision invites more mischief 
and misappropriation if an Aleynikov-like individual can tiptoe the balance 
struck by the court. It seems surreal to build protective measures that 
penalize the type of actions that Aleynikov perpetuated, and then 
deconstruct these measures to a point where they are incapable of fulfilling 
their actual intent. Heydon’s Case offers an alternative approach to 
legislative analysis that the Second Circuit may have been better served in 
undertaking. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The NSPA and the EEA are not beyond salvage; instead both can be 
transformed into powerful weapons that protect intangible intellectual 
property. The traditional forms of intellectual property are always available 
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97 U.S. Legal Definitions, “Mischief Rule Law & Legal Definition,” available at http://definitions 
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98 Robin Kundia Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principal and Why It Matters: Statutory 
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955, 1035 (2005). 
99 See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 
(1899); Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490 (1893). 
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to businesses in an attempt to protect their property. This does not detract 
from the fact that our economy is moving further into an information 
technology based model. Yariel Flores asserts that the “overlapping of 
protections increases the development, production, and sales cost of 
software.”100 With technology based start-ups littering the business 
landscape like never before, it is instrumental that we adequately protect the 
valuable intangibles that they produce. 
The overly strict legislative reading committed by the Second Circuit 
not only subverts the true purpose of the NSPA and the EEA; it also clouds 
an area of the law that demands clarification. Allowing a former Goldman 
Sachs employee to steal valuable, confidential source code and then attempt 
to pass it along to his new employer, is an action that cannot be condoned. 
The legislative modification to the EEA in late 2012 is a positive step, but 
work remains, especially concerning the NSPA. Definitive and 
unambiguous statements need to be made in the area of source code 
protection. While Aleynikov may have escaped punishment under the 
NSPA and the EEA because of a strict interpretation by the court, his 
actions demonstrate that wholesale changes need to be made to deter 
similar actions from occurring in the future. 
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